Introducing merit recruitment of public servants is a central good governance reform. To move towards merit in practice, legislation which mandates merit recruitment is considered a necessary but insufficient first step by many scholars and practitioners. Merit-based civil service legislation should thus be sought before reform in practice. This paper challenges this reasoning. It argues that merit laws are neither sufficient nor necessary: they leave the 
what this paper terms façade meritocracy: the manipulation of seemingly meritocratic examinations to favour preferred candidates. And lastly, incumbents may ignore merit laws: the absence of rule-of-law contexts are characteristic of patronage states (Charron, Dahlström and Lapuente, 2012; Fukuyama 2014, p. 51) . Public servants -including those in charge of legal compliance -are appointed based on political and personal criteria. Correspondingly, their decision-making typically prioritizes political-personal over professional-legal criteria.
Legal violations of merit laws thus tend to go unpunished, turning them into 'dead letter [s] ' (Goetz 2001 (Goetz , p. 1036 .
The latter three mechanisms are often at play due to 'window dressing' attempts by incumbents: the appearance of reform progress without reform in practice (Andrews, 2013) .
Merit legislation can thus lead to formal institutions which are merely 'ceremonial ' (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 340) , enabling developing countries to assume the forms of modern states without functioning like them (Pritchett, Woolcock and Andrews, 2010) . As a corollary, implementing legal merit requirements is in practice optional to incumbents in patronage states.
Consequently, merit legislation is argued to be insufficient to bring about merit in practice. At the same time, however, it is argued to create a formal institution which, through its 'activation,' permits incumbents to move towards meritocratic civil service management in practice (cf. Levitsky and Murillo 2013, p. 103) . In other words, merit laws are considered necessary, even if insufficient for reform in practice.
This argument carries an important normative implication for the sequencing of civil service reforms. If merit legislation is a necessary condition for reform in practice, practitioners should seek merit legislation before seeking advances in meritocratic civil service management in practice. Taken at face value, this normative implication provides one important rationale and justification for the frequent reliance on merit laws in civil service reform strategies.
The argument developed in the next section will challenge this line of reasoning: legal reform need not come first.
Why Merit Laws Are Not Necessary for Merit in Practice
As shall be argued, merit legislation is not only insufficient but also unnecessary for merit reform in practice. To explain why merit laws are not necessary for merit in practice, one of the mechanisms underlying the insufficiency of merit legislation can be built on and extended.
To construct the argument, recall that merit laws are civil service laws mandating open and competitive procedures for personnel selection. In their absence, personnel selection will be governed by other procedures. Such procedures may or may not prohibit merit-based personnel selection. Irrespective of whether they do, however, introducing merit is -as shall be argued -in practice optional to incumbents.
Consider, first, an incumbent in a patronage state facing a legal prohibition of meritbased personnel selections. Whether to comply with this legal prohibition or violate it by introducing merit recruitment is, in practice, optional to the incumbent. As aforementioned, (un)rule of law contexts are characteristic of patronage states (see Charron, Dahlström and Lapuente, 2012; Fukuyama 2014, p. 51) . In other words, incumbents may non-comply with both good and bad governance legislation at will in patronage states. One dimension of good governance in practice -merit-based personnel selections -may thus emerge despite bad governance legislation prohibiting such practices. Somewhat ironically, the very lack of one good governance dimension in patronage states -the absence of strong rule of law and concomitant prevalence of informal institutionality (cf. Helmke and Levitsky, 2006 ) -can thus facilitate the emergence of meritocracy as another good governance practice.
Empirically, however, explicit legal prohibitions of merit may be expected to remain rare given their window dressing costs. In fact, a review of current public personnel and labour legislation in Spanish-speaking Latin America by the author revealed no instance. In such contexts, a second mechanism enabling merit in practice without merit legislation is activated: the introduction of meritocratic examinations as a residual right of incumbents. As, in the absence of legal merit requirements, laws neither demand merit nor prohibit it, merit in practice is optional to incumbents.
With or without merit laws, meritocratic civil service management thus tends to be de facto optional for incumbents in patronage states. Consequently, merit laws do not affect the incumbent's possibility frontier for patronage and meritocracy in practice. This challenges a key practitioner rationale for advancing merit legislation: incumbents may advance merit in practice without seeking legal reform first.
That incumbents are able to advance merit in practice without seeking legal reform first, of course, does not imply that they face incentives to do so.
2 In fact, we would expect this scenario to be the exception. Where possible, incumbents are likely to prefer seeking legal reform first. As a signal of reform commitment to external stakeholders, legal reform may enhance incumbent legitimacy in patronage states irrespective of merit practice (cf. Andrews, 2013) . Moreover, specifying a merit requirement in law may potentially facilitate reform implementation by aligning merit practice with formal legal requirements. While incumbents may thus be expected to, typically, seek legal reform first, they may find themselves in contexts in which they wish to advance merit practice, yet are unable to pass legal reform. Consider, for instance, an executive who wishes to advance merit practice, yet does not count on a majority in a hostile legislature to pass civil service legislation.
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Alternatively, consider an executive who wishes to advance merit practice from the get-go when coming to power, without awaiting the typically lengthier process of approval of merit legislation. In such contexts, incumbents may be expected to seek merit practice before legal reform. This holds not least as such reforms need not be short-lived. Extrapolating from research on informal institutions (cf. Helmke and Levitsky, 2006) , reform institutionalization in patronage states with high levels of informality arguably depends principally on whether competitive examinations replace patronage appointments as the prevalent (informal) norm for personnel decisions.
The empirical expectation is thus clear: reform in practice occurs on occasion before legal reform, yet this reform sequencing is the exception rather than the rule. The next sections will assess the empirical validity of this claim. Before doing so, it is worth clarifying what this claim is not connoting: that merit laws do not impact merit practice. Even if merit laws are not necessary for merit in practice -which undoes one important rationale for relying on them -they might shape merit practice. The conclusion will return to this separate empirical question.
Merit Laws are neither Necessary nor Sufficient:
Evidence from an Original Civil Service Legislation Dataset
Assessing whether merit laws are necessary or sufficient for merit in practice requires data on merit in law and practice. This data shall be described first. Subsequently, the necessity and sufficiency of merit legislation for merit practice is empirically assessed. To remedy this data gap -and enable an empirical assessment of this paper's argument of Government (QoG) expert survey on the structure of government (Dahlberg et al. 2013; Dahlström et al. 2015) .
Data on Merit in Practice.
Merit in practice is measured by drawing on data from two sources.
The first and principal measure of merit in practice comes from the QoG global expert survey. 107 and 121 countries with at least three expert respondents each were covered in two survey waves (Dahlberg et al. 2013; Dahlström et al. 2015) . Merit in practice is measured with the survey question 'When recruiting public sector employees, the skills and merits of the applicants decide who gets the job?' Countries score, on average, slightly above the midpoint of the 1-7 scale for this question (4.03, with 7 being the most meritocratic) (table 1).
The second measure for merit in practice comes from the Varieties of Democracy (VDem) project. V-Dem covers 173 countries from 1900 to 2012, based on estimates from over 2,500 country experts (Coppedge et al., 2016) . Contrary to the QoG measure, it thus permits an analysis of temporal change. At the same time, its construct validity is weaker. V-Dem asks experts to assess the extent to which a country's public administration is characterized by impartiality. Over the next fifteen years, until 1990, this share increased incrementally to 38 percent ( In sum then, the share of countries with merit laws on the books has more than doubled in the last forty years. With the rise of the good governance agenda in the 1990s, the pace of merit law adoption has accelerated.
As illustrated in figure 2, however, this proliferation of merit legislation has not been a sufficient condition for meritocracy in practice. In fact, the extent of merit in practice as measured by the QoG survey is statistically indistinguishable between countries with and without legal merit requirements, with both hovering around the midpoint of the scale (at 4.00 and 4.06 respectively). This provides large-n evidence for qualitative assertions in previous studies that merit laws by themselves are insufficient to achieve merit in practice.
FIGURE 2. Merit in Practice with and without Legal Merit Requirements (2015)
Data sources: author's merit law dataset, CCP (2015), Dahlberg et al. (2013) and Dahlström et al. (2015) Congruent with this paper's argument, a frequency distribution of the data additionally suggests that merit legislation is not necessary for merit in practice. As illustrated in figure 3, a number of countries score high on merit in practice in the QoG survey data without having had a legal merit requirement in place in any year between 1975 and 2015. 
Frequency Distributions of Merit in Practice and Legal Merit Requirements
Merit in Practice without Merit Legislation (1975 Merit in Practice with Merit Legislation (in at least one year in 1975 Data sources: author's merit law dataset, CCP (2015), Dahlberg et al. (2013) and Dahlström et al. (2015) Of course, countries which score high on merit in practice despite not having had a legal To contextualize this analysis, note that meritocracy in practice -as proxied by the VDem measure -has progressed less in 1975-2012 than meritocracy in law. As illustrated in figure 4 , the average V-Dem score improved from 1.85 to 2.4 (on a scale from 0 to 4) for countries with coded civil service legislation. Almost all of this increase -from 1.85 to 2.33 -occurred prior to the 1990s for countries in the sample, however, thus preceding the widespread adoption of merit legislation. (2015) and Coppedge et al. (2016) As theoretically predicted, progress was thereby made by countries with and without merit- 
FIGURE 5. Changes in Merit in Practice and Legal Merit Requirements

Merit in Practice Change without Merit Legislation in any year in 1975-2012
Merit in Practice Change with Merit Legislation in at least one year Data sources: author's civil service legislation dataset, CCP (2015) and Coppedge et al. (2016) Analyses of both V-Dem and QoG data thus suggest that merit-based civil service legislation is neither sufficient nor necessary for meritocratic civil service management in practice. The large-n data, of course, leaves unresolved whether the mechanisms theorized in this paper can account for the lack of necessity and sufficiency of merit laws. These mechanisms are thus assessed qualitatively next.
Merit Laws are neither Necessary nor Sufficient: Evidence from Paraguay and the Dominican Republic
To assess the mechanisms (de)linking merit laws from merit practice, two cases were sought with comparable merit reform implementation capacity, yet contrasting legal merit requirements. These case selection criteria yielded reforms in Paraguay under President Fernando Lugo (2008 and the Dominican Republic under President Leonel Fernández (2004 . The two countries are archetypical patronage states with similarly low bureaucratic capacity, weak rule of law, similar levels of technical and financial assistance To substantiate these conclusions, data collection in the two cases comprised reviews of legislation; requests for data on merit-based examinations to state institutions; and 130 semistructured interviews -65 in each country. Two protocols were administered: one on merit reform processes and one measuring merit in practice through coded expert estimates. The expert survey provided estimates of substantively competitive -and thus merit-basedexaminations for public sector positions. The burden on these estimates is limited: they serve to triangulate official data on merit-based examinations. Façade merit reforms could thus be detected.
Experts provided estimates for fifteen typical state institutions in five policy areas.
These accounted for 74 (Paraguay) and 51 (DR) percent of public employment (see Schuster, 2015, p. 284 for details of included institutions). In total, 103 institutional-level estimates were obtained. Institutional means, weighted by the number of public employees, were averaged to obtain country-level means. This is a second-best: patronage as a phenomenon of 'covert politics' cannot be estimated precisely (Müller 2000, p. 141) . Poor recall, judgment error and strategic bias all threaten estimate validity. To counteract these threats, at least five experts were surveyed per policy area; varied backgrounds were sought (figure 6); and, as noted, expert estimates were triangulated with official examination figures. Enhancing confidence in validity, estimates varied little across respondents; linearized standard errors stood at 0.02 (DR) and 0.05 (Paraguay). Moreover, expert estimates coincided with results from official data on merit examinations. According to prior studies, merit in practice should thus advance, if at all, in the DR rather than Paraguay. Yet, congruent with the argument in this paper, the opposite occurred.
Spoils under Merit Laws, Meritocracy without Merit Laws
Official data and expert estimates yield consistent results: merit in practice only advanced in Paraguay.
Official Data on Competitive Examinations.
In Paraguay, the number of competitive examinations supervised by the Ministry of Civil Service (Secretaría de la Función Pública, SFP) rose from seven in the country's history prior to Lugo to 24,325 under Lugo -roughly 26 percent of all public sector vacancies (figure 7).
6 Examinations focused on technical-level positions (81 percent). While the majority of vacancies remained available for patronage, reform was substantive in comparative terms. In the U.S., for instance, it took 21 years after the 1883 Pendleton Act to extend the merit service to 50 percent of public service (Johnson and Libecap 1994) . By contrast, under Lugo, roughly a quarter of vacancies were professionalized within a four-year administration.
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In the DR, however, merit in practice stalled. The Ministry of Public Administration (MAP) supervised competitive examinations to fill 1,820 vacancies -less than one percent of vacancies -under Fernández.
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FIGURE 7 Vacancies Filled through Examinations Supervised by Civil Service Agencies
Source: author's own elaboration, based on data in MAP (2013), SFP (2013) and Participación Ciudadana (2007) Expert estimates.
To counteract façade meritocracies, civil service ministries in the two countries Wald test. In contrast, the increase under Lugo is significant at the 1 percent level.
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FIGURE 8 Expert Estimates: Share of Vacancies Filled through Substantively Competitive Examinations
Dominican Republic Paraguay
Source: author's expert survey
Other evidence enhances confidence in expert estimate validity. In Paraguay, opposition parties took examinations seriously as job opportunities for affiliates, offering training courses in party offices to prepare members for examinations (Interview F) . Moreover, formal complaints were filed against less than 0.5 percent of examinations supervised by the SFP (Interview G) . By contrast, in the DR, even Fernández' director of the national council for state reform (Interview H) concluded that 'they undertake competitive processes, but at the end the position is awarded to whom the incumbent wants -and, at the moment of decision-making, the party criteria are of weight … it is a disgrace.' Unsurprisingly, 'citizens, generally speaking, do not trust this selection process. They understand that it is a politicized process. When state institutions seek to recruit via public examinations, they often have to repeat the process two or three times as they frequently do not receive applications, because people say: 'ah, they call for an examination, but already have whom to select there.' In the DR's weak rule-of-law context, institutions could also simply violate the law.
Temporary patronage appointees were incorporated into permanent career positions, for instance -despite a legal prohibition. As a MAP vice-minister (Interview K) lamented, 'no competitive examinations were undertaken, but nonetheless they contracted personnel extraofficially … which [then] stays for 10 years.'
Lastly, even where examinations occurred, they were vulnerable to manipulation (Interviews L, M, N, O and P). To name a few: terms of reference were tailored to preferred candidates; vacancy dissemination restricted to party members and friends; exam materials leaked; interview evaluations skewed; competing candidates excluded due to 'losses' of their applications; or candidates other than examination winners recruited.
As a consequence, 'the public service law until now remains a myth. It is constitutional and administrative poetry.' (Interview Q) How Meritocracy Advances in Practice Without Merit Laws: Evidence from Paraguay.
By contrast, in Paraguay, no law requiring merit was in force. The 2000 public service law was suspended, and Lugo's minority position in parliament coupled with opposition party antagonism to state reforms precluded the passage of legal reform (Schuster, 2015) . With the 2000 public service law suspended, the 1970 civil servant statute from the Alfredo Stroessner Dictatorship (1954 Dictatorship ( -1989 and -for staff and institutions not governed by the statute -the civil and labour codes, among others, applied (Sosa Arrua, 2011).
None of these statutes explicitly prohibited merit in practice. In fact, even Stroessner's 1970 statute established that administrative career recruitment was to be 'subject to prior verification of … capacity and aptitudes.' (Congreso de la Nación Paraguaya 1970, p.
2) The statute did not require fair and open competition, advertised vacancies or the recruitment of the best available candidate. As such, it fell short of a legal merit requirement as understood in this paper and, typically, by practitioners and scholars (see, among many, Grindle 2012;
UK Civil Service Commission 2012). Yet, the statute was permissive of merit examinations.
With legislation permitting -yet not demanding -merit in practice, the second theorized causal mechanism to account for merit in practice without merit legislation was other public sector legislation (Nickson and Lambert, 2002) .
The absence of merit legislation thus did not alter Lugo's possibility frontier for -or ability to advance -patronage and merit in practice.
This is not to say that reform without legislation was Lugo's first choice. The Lugo administration did seek to reform the 2000 public service law, yet its legislative minority position precluded passage (Schuster, 2015) . As theorized, the Lugo administration was nonetheless able to advance to merit in practice, and did so from the first month in office.
While this explains why Lugo advanced merit in practice without legal reform, it leaves unanswered the separate empirical question why Lugo advanced merit at all. As detailed in Schuster (2015) , merit legislation had little to do with this. Instead, political incentives loomed large: reform mobilized political support from voters who valued improved public service delivery, while depriving political opponents of patronage access.
The case comparison thus provides evidence for both the paper's argument -merit laws are neither sufficient nor necessary for merit in practice -and its underlying mechanisms.
Implications for Scholars and Practitioners
With the rise of the good governance agenda, merit-based civil service legislation has -as evidenced in this paper -proliferated since the 1990s. This has been paralleled by the spread of other good governance legislation, from freedom of information to anti-corruption laws, among many (see, e.g., Berliner, 2014) . It is, by now, axiomatic to note that such legislation is by itself insufficient to bring about public sector reform in practice -and this paper has added large-and small-n evidence for the case of civil service legislation to this end. Progress towards merit in practice in the cross-country dataset, for instance, has been much less farreaching than progress towards merit legislation over the last forty years.
At the same time, conventional scholarly and practitioner wisdom holds that public sector reform legislation is a necessary first step to bring about reform in practice. Taken at face value, this suggests reformers need to adopt legislation before seeking reform in practice.
Focusing on merit-based civil service legislation, this paper has challenged this reasoning: legal reforms need not come first. Instead, merit legislation leaves incumbent possibility frontiers for patronage and meritocracy in practice unaffected in patronage states.
As such, reformers may advance merit in practice with and without merit legislation. Large-n and small-n evidence support this assertion. Data from an original merit law dataset suggests that countries may introduce merit in practice without merit legislation. And the Paraguayan case illustrates that reformers may advance merit in practice even when they are unable to introduce merit legislation and thus demand legal compliance.
The evidence also suggests this reform sequencing is the exception: reformers tend to introduce legislation before reform in practice. On occasion, however, reform in practice happens without legal reform.
While the weight of the evidence thus remains stronger for the insufficiency of legislation, the cases of reform in practice without law suggest a broader, tentative implication for good governance legislation: incumbents may advance good governance practices in patronage states irrespective of good governance laws. Somewhat ironically, the absence of one important good governance dimension -a strong rule of law -implies that outlawing bad and good governance practices is often ineffectual in patronage states. Instead, with informal institutionality prevalent, an incumbent's possibility frontier for good and bad Lastly, it is worth re-emphasizing that the paper's conclusion about the lack of necessity of merit laws does not imply that such laws -or good governance laws more generally -have no causal efficacy. Whether they do is a separate empirical question. The lack of necessity of merit legislation for merit in practice does suggest, however, that causal efficacy cannot be taken for granted. Yet, numerous large-n studies in the existing literature do just that, When these criteria applied, countries were nonetheless not coded as having merit laws if:
1. Other selection criteria could override merit. To illustrate, where the law introduced a merit requirement, yet also quotas for ethnic minorities, the law was not coded as merit-based if it provided incumbents with discretion in deciding which ethnic minority applicant to hire. The merit requirement was maintained, however, when the law required incumbents to select among members of the quota group based on merit.
2. The merit requirement was waived for a percentage of applicants or for applicants with certain qualifications.
3. Civil service legislation only demanded that recruits count on the requisite qualifications and/or pass an (uncompetitive) examination -rather than win an open competition with other candidates and/or be hired solely based on merit.
4. The merit requirement was not included in legislation but only lower-ranking decrees.
Coding Procedure.
Each legislation was independently coded by both a research assistant and the author. In the select cases in which the coding diverged, a consensus was sought. If a consensus could not be reached or the law's phrasing precluded unambiguous coding, the data was coded as missing in the dataset instead.
For 81 percent of the 4174 country-year observations, the data source for the coding was the legislation itself. Copies of relevant laws were either found online through Google searches or requested from the International Labour Organization's (ILO) NATLEX database team. The remaining 19 percent of country-year observations were based on secondary sources. Secondary sources served largely to verify the lack of any civil service legislation (16 percent of country-year observations). For three percent of country-year observations, secondary sources were sufficiently precise -typically by citing civil service legislation which was otherwise unavailable -to enable the coding of legal merit requirements.
Notes
1 Professional states vary in the criteria prioritized in competitive examinations, be these academic credentials, professional skills or work experience, for instance (Evans 1998, p. 71) . The argument in this paper is unaffected by this variation.
2 For a recent review of the range of incentives which may underlie merit reforms, see Schuster (2016) . groups such as teachers, judges, diplomats and the police and autonomous institutions such as Central Banks and tax agencies (see Schuster 2015, p. 106 ). Yet, without civil service agency supervision, such examinations were, as illustrated in the text, often vulnerable to manipulations. 9 The Paraguayan test yielded a p-value of 0.001 with 86 degrees of freedom (df); the DR test yielded a p-value of 0.374 with 98 df. The statistical results in figure 8 should be interpreted with caution: they assume an approximate normal distribution. As detailed, experts were not sampled randomly and independently, but rather purposively and through chain referral; as such, the normal distribution assumption may not hold.
10 That examinations in the DR remained marginal in number and were subject to manipulation is not to say that they had no effect when they occurred. In fact, Oliveros and Schuster (2017) show that merit recruits are more motivated to work hard, less corrupt and less likely to engage in clientelism in the DR.
